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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OP UTAH 
Craig J. Reece, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Board of Regents of the State of Utah 
and The University of Utah, 
Defendants and Respondents, 
No. 19600 
PETITION FOR 
REHEARING 
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 35, Craig J. 
Reece, Plaintiff and Appellant in this matter, hereby petitions 
for rehearing in this matter. The Court issued an Opinion on 
July 29, 1987 that was received by the Appellant by mail on 
July 31, 1987. As explained more fully herein, the basis for 
this Petition for Rehearing is as follows: 
I. The Court did not apply the law governing appeals 
from summary judgment; 
II. The facts and inferences supporting the Courtfs 
Opinion are contradicted by or absent from the 
record; 
III. The Respondent's rent increase procedures deny due 
process; and 
IV. Several issues raised on appeal remain unresolved. 
Appellant brought this suit against the Respondents in 1983 
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to challenge the procedures for increasing rent at married 
student housing at the University of Utah The Appellant also j 
claims that the manner in which rent was spent violated due 
process and equal protection. This Court's opinion found, 
among other things, that the procedures employed by the { 
University to increase rent did not deny due process of law 
under the federal and state constitutions. As discussed more 
fully herein, the Court's opinion misapplied the law relating 
to summary judgment and misapplied the law and the facts 
applicable to the constitutional claims raised by the 
Appellant. 
I 
THE COURT DID NOT APPLY THE LAW GOVERNING < 
APPEALS PROM SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The appeal to this Court was from the entry of Summary 
Judgment in favor of both Respondents. The Board of Regents 
i 
filed a Motion to Dismiss, but that motion was based on 
affidavits and other matters outside the pleadings that were 
attached to the motion. Therefore, the Board's Motion to 
"i 
Dismiss was supposed to be treated as a Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Utah R. Civ. P.12(b); Strand v. Associated Students 
of The University of Utah, 561 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1977). On 
i 
appeal from a summary judgment, the court reviews the pleadings 
and the file in a light most favorable to the party against 
whom summary judgment was entered. 
i 
If there is any doubt or uncertainty 
concerning questions of fact, the doubt 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
should be resolved in favor of the opposing 
party. Thus, the court must evaluate all 
the evidence and all reasonable inferences 
fairly drawn from the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the party opposing 
summary judgment. 
Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982). Summary 
Judgment "should be granted only when it clearly appears that 
there is no reasonable probability that the party moved against 
could prevail." Snyder v. Merkley, 693 P.2d 64, 65 (Utah 1984). 
As discussed below, the Respondent's facts in this case 
were nonexistent or disputed while the Appellant's facts 
supported his claims. The Appellant was not allowed to have 
discovery. Appellant's Brief at 5; Appellant's Reply Brief at 
9-11. Given this state of the record, the Court should have 
reversed the trial court in order to allow further discovery or 
trial. 
The Court's standard of review fails to give effect to the 
federal laws applicable to this case. The suit was filed, 
inter alia, under the federal Civil Rights Statute, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, and federal regulations for subsidized housing may 
apply. Record at 322. By indulging all inferences in favor of 
the Respondent and disallowing discovery, the Court applied 
different standards than apply in other cases and impaired 
Appellant's ability to pursue the federal claims. This 
procedure fails to give effect to the remedial purpose of the 
federal laws and is inconsistent with federal laws. See Perry 
v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 603 (1972) (civil rights plaintiff 
must be allowed an opportunity to prove the claim) and Adickes 
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v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (summary judgment 
should be denied if defendant's proof fails to preclude all 
theories of recovery). 
II 
THE FACTS SUPPORTING THE COURT'S OPINION ARE 
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD 
A number of key factual statements in the opinion are not 
supported by the record. The individual contested facts are 
discussed separately below. 
The Court claimed that the Appellant argued that the Board 
of Regent's authority to set rent was delegated to the 
University in May, 1980. Slip op. at 2. This argument was 
raised and maintained by the Respondents and opposed by the 
Appellant. The Court found that the power to set rent was 
delegated in the bond resolution, but none of the parties ever 
argued that position. If that were true, then there would have 
been no need for the Respondents to argue that the May, 1980 
policy effected a delegation of the power of ultimate 
approval. The bond resolution does nothing more than allow the 
University to recommend rental rates to the Board of Regents. 
"Following the procedures outlined in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46-12 (1953), the Board properly delegated to the 
University of Utah Institutional Council the power to approve 
new construction up to $1,000,000." Slip op. at 4 (footnote 
omitted). There was never any evidencarintroduced as to what 
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procedures the Board of Regents employed at any time. 
Appellant's Reply Brief at 3. It is not possible to assume 
that a statute was followed when there was never any evidence 
introduced on that point. In fact, none of the parties ever 
raised a question as to whether the delegation of authority to 
approve new construction complied with the Administrative 
Procedures Act. Rather, the Appellant consistently argued that 
this authority cannot be delegated because it was contrary to 
the statute. Appellant's Brief at 29-31, Appellant's Reply 
Brief at 4. The Respondent's argument simply removes a section 
of the statute that the Legislature obviously thought was 
important. 
"A procedure was in place whereby questions or problems 
[concerning rent increases] could be directed to the student 
housing representative." Slip op. at 3. There is nothing in 
the record about what this procedure was, so the Court cannot 
conclude that it would satisfy due process. It was simply a 
statement of fact by the Respondents that was disputed by two 
affidavits in the record. Record at 317 and 353-55. 
"Either the tenant or the student housing representative 
could address the institutional Council, which must approve all 
rent increases." Slip op. at 3. The alleged student housing 
representative was never identified and his relationship to the 
Appellant is unknown. There is no evidence that the council 
would accept discussion by the public. In any event, nobody 
could address the Institutional council concerning rent 
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increases because the record does not show that the 
Institutional Council ever notified anybody when it was 
considering rent increases. 
"Notice of the council meetings is publicly posted." Slip 
op. at 3. Although technically correct, this statement is 
misleading and irrelevant. The posted agendas for the 
Institutional Council did not say anything about rent 
increases. There is no evidence that they did. It was 
deceptive for the Respondents to create the illusion that the 
posted notices were accessible to the Appellant or contained 
information about rent increases when that was not, in fact, 
the case. 
"The trial judge acknowledged the outstanding discovery 
request and concluded that his Order would completely dispose 
of Plaintiff's Complaint." Slip op. at 5. This is an incorrect 
recitation of the Respondent's version of what the judge 
allegedly said. The Respondents claimed that the judge 
"acknowledged that his order would cut off the discovery." 
Respondent's Brief at 25. Neither version is correct or 
supported by the record. in response to the Respondent's 
request for an extension of time to to answer the discovery 
requests, the trial judge said that he was taking the matter 
under advisement and would rule on the motions before the 
response time for the discovery requests would expire. The 
judge said this would give the Respondents adequate opportunity 
to answer the discovery requests or move for a continuance if 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
necessary. The Appellant has scrupulously avoided testifying 
about facts not in the record. However, testimony by counsel 
for Respondents leaves the Appellant no choice but to try to 
correct the record. 
lt[N]o request for a continuance appears in the record." 
Slip op. at 5. The Motion for Continuance is found in the 
Record at 314-17 and 325. The Respondent's admitted at trial 
that a Motion for Continuance pursuant to Rule 56 (f) had been 
filed. Record at 330-31. These matters are in the Appellant's 
Reply Brief at 10.N The existence of a Motion for Continuance 
was not disputed in the Trial Court, only the merits of the 
motion were under discussion. In any event, Rule 56(f) does 
not require a motion, it only requires affidavits such as those 
provided by the Appellant. See Strand v. Associated Students, 
561 P.2d at 193-94 (it was error to disallow discovery where an 
affidavit was filed four days prior to the hearing). 
Ill 
THE PROCEDURES USED TO INCREASE 
RENT DENY DUE PROCESS 
The Court's opinion noted three reasons for concluding that 
the Respondents provided adequate due process when increasing 
rent. These reasons are based on unsubstantiated and 
incomplete statements of fact that are legally insufficient to 
provide due process. 
First, the Court stated that there was a procedure by which 
questions or problems concerning rent increases could be 
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directed to a student housing representative. Slip op. at 3. 
There is nothing in the record showing who this representative 
is, what their relationship with the Appellant was, whether the 
representative had access to information on rent increases, 
whether the representative knew that they were responsible for 
implementing the constitutional rights of the tenants, nor 
whether the representatives knew how to transmit concerns to 
the appropriate University officials. Without this factual 
record, one can only conclude that the Court's opinion stands 
for the proposition that the mere existence of student 
organizations is sufficient to satisfy due process for any and 
all deprivations of property perpetrated by the University, in 
other words, nothing more than a "Dear Abby" satisfies due 
process. There is an affidavit in the record from the 
President of the Village Assembly, which is one of the student 
organizations at the apartment complex. He was never aware of 
any opportunities to make his objections known to the 
Institutional council and he could not obtain the public 
records concerning rent increases. Record at 353-55* 
The possible existence of a student group is irrelevant. 
Constitutional rights are personal rights that can be asserted 
only by the person affected by the government action. United 
States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960); Cavaness v. Cox, 598 
P.2d 349 (Utah 1979). Due process requires that the affected 
persons have direct access to the decisionmaker. The mere fact 
thaJ^sqmfbody else might know about unconstitutional conduct 
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and have access to the decisionmaker is irrelevant. Memphis 
Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1978). 
The Court should consider the impact of its decision on the 
personal liability of the alleged student representatives. 
There is no evidence, and the Appellant specifically disavows, 
that any students have been chosen as agents or representatives 
of the Appellant with respect to rent increases. Regardless 
whether the imaginary student representatives are agents of the 
Appellant or the State, such representatives could be 
personally liable for failing to adequately fulfill their 
responsibilities as custodians of legal rights. The Appellant 
does not favor this result but it is a logical and natural 
consequence of the official status bestowed upon these alleged 
representatives by the Courtfs opinion. If they have an 
obligation to represent someone, they can be personally liable 
for failure to do so. If they have no obligation, then the 
existence of student representatives is irrelevant to this case. 
Second, the Courtfs opinion stated that the notice for the 
Institutional Council meeting was posted in a public place. 
However, the notice did not indicate that rent increases would 
be considered at the meeting for which the notice was issued. 
Therefore, the Court's opinion must stand for the proposition 
that a notice that says nothing about the deprivation of 
property satisfies due process. This holding is contrary to 
Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983); and is also 
inconsistent with every decision the United States Supreme 
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Court has issued on the subject. Under the Utah Open Meeting 
Statute, if the meeting agenda did not list an item for 
discussion, it would have been improper for the institutional 
Council to have received comments concerning rent increases. 
Even if the Appellant had appeared at the meeting, it is 
doubtful how much substantive discussion would have occurred. 
In any event, the Court cannot conclude that a notice of a 
meeting posted in a "public place" satisfies due process. Due 
process requires notice that is most likely to convey the 
necessary information to the affected party. A substitute for 
personal service is allowed only if personal service would be 
an unreasonable burden under the circumstances. Mennonite 
Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983). A posted 
notice is constitutionally deficient if there is evidence to 
indicate that the affected parties do not, in fact, have a 
reasonable liklihood of being notified of the pending 
government action. Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444 (1982). It 
is contrary to law to automatically conclude that posted notice 
was sufficient when more direct and informative means of notice 
were plainly available. In fact, the Respondents did provide 
personal notice of the effective date of rent increase, so it 
would have been no additional burden to include information on 
the time and place of the appropriate meetings. 
Finally, the Court places reliance on the fact that notice 
of the effective date of the rent increase was sent to the 
Appellant. The Court acknowledges that the notice did not 
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mention the time and date of the Council meeting where the 
increases would be considered. Slip op. at 3. The notice 
provided by the Respondents was not only deficient, it was 
deceptive and misleading. The notice indicated that the 
decision was final, so there would have been no need for the 
Appellant to even attempt to appear at an institutional Council 
meeting. Appellant's Brief at 19-20. It is not apparent how a 
notice can be "fair" if it is deceptive and fails to convey the 
necessary information. 
IV. 
SEVERAL IMPORTANT ISSUES WERE NOT 
ADDRESSED IN THE COURT'S OPINION 
The Court's opinion failed to address several important 
constitutional issues that were raised in this case. First, as 
mentioned in the opening paragraph of the opinion, this suit 
claims that the Respondent's practices deny equal protection of 
the law. The resolution of the equal protection argument is 
not mentioned in the opinion. Although the Appellant was not 
allowed to have any discovery, he did identify several 
expenditures that deny equal protection: (1) using rent to 
subsidize other facilities in the Student Housing Bond System; 
(2) using rent to construct new buildings for the economic 
benefit of the University and other tenants; (3) surplus 
utility charges are taken by the University; (4) interest 
earned from rent is taken by the University; (5) the Village is 
used to subsidize University operations; and (6) surplus rent 
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is given to the University, Appellant's Brief at 22. These 
expenditures deny equal protection by (1) discriminating 
between students who live in the Village and students, faculty 
and staff who do not live at the Village, and (2) 
discriminating between students who live in the Village at 
different times. The basis of the argument is that these 
expenditures provide minimal to nonexistent benefits to the 
Appellant while others who do benefit are riot required to share 
the financial burdens. Numerous factual and legal questions 
exist concerning the extent of the discrimination between the 
Appellant and the faculty, staff and other students at the 
University. 
Another unresolved issue is whether using rent to construct 
and remodel buildings and subsidize the University violates 
substantive due process. Appellant's Brief at 21-31. In 
connection with this argument, Appellant also points out that 
the capital improvements for the Village were never approved by 
the Institutional Council and are therefore unlawful. 
Appellant's Brief at 30. The approval required for capital 
improvements was not addressed in the Court's opinion and the 
Respondents did not dispute the substantive due process 
allegations. 
The Court's Opinion also did not discuss whether the 
meetings of the institutional Council were the proper kind of 
"hearing" required by due process. This is because the meeting 
does not involve discussion of any evidence. There is no 
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effective means of disputing a rent increase when the 
University is not required to justify what it is asking for and 
prevents access to the necessary public documents. Appellant's 
Brief at 17-18. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court has a great opportunity to advance the rights of 
the public when faced with arbitrary and unlawful state action 
that deprives citizens of substantial sums of money. During 
the bicentennial celebration of the Constitution, it is only 
fitting that the Court zealously fulfill its role as an 
impartial guardian of the rights of private citizens. For the 
reasons stated herein, the Petition for Rehearing should be 
granted. 
Appellant certifies that this Petition for Rehearing is 
filed in good faith and not for purposes of delay. 
Dated this IQ day of August, 1987. 
Craig J 
Appellan o Se 
Copy of the foregoing mailed 
this |^ > day of August, 1987, 
to: 
David L. Wilkinson, 
Douglas E. Richards and 
William L. Walker 
Attorneys for Respondents 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah) 84114 
By (jAm^y<m~ 
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